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ABSTRACT 
Although self-control often requires behavioral inaction (i.e., not eating a piece of cake), the 
process of inhibiting impulsive behavior is commonly characterized as extremely cognitively 
active (i.e., actively exerting self-control). Two experiments examined whether motivation for 
action or inaction facilitates self-control behavior in the presence of tempting stimuli. 
Experiment 1 used a delay discounting task to assess the ability to delay gratification with 
respect to money. Experiment 2 used a Go/No-Go task to assess the ability to inhibit a dominant 
but incorrect motor response to the words “condom” and “sex”. The results demonstrate that 
general goals for inaction promote self-control, whereas general goals for action promote 
impulsive behavior. These findings are discussed in light of recent evidence suggesting that goals 
for action and inaction modulate physiological resources that promote behavioral execution. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Imagine you are at a party and the hosts have graciously supplied an extensive selection 
of hors d'oeuvres and desserts for the guests to enjoy.  Unfortunately, you have just gone on a 
diet, and now you are confronted with a common and unpleasant dilemma: you need to exert 
self-control and overcome your desire to indulge in a piece of chocolate cake so you can get in 
shape and look good this bathing suit season.  How should you proceed? Common parlance 
would urge you to “exert” your willpower, “fight” the temptation, “overcome” your desire, 
“control” your impulse, and other variations on the theme of actively countering your urge to eat.  
Although action in the face of a temptation seems like a plausible route to self-control success, 
self-control itself often requires behavioral inaction.  That is, to succeed in your diet, you must 
not eat, which is an inaction.  Due to this paradox it is unclear whether self-control is better 
accomplished through general goals to be active or inactive. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Defining self-control and general goals for action and inaction 
Self-control can be defined as the ability to delay gratification and pursue long-term goals 
over short-term goals (Ainslie, 1975), as well as the ability to inhibit dominant responses (Logan 
& Cowan, 1984; Swann, Bjork, Moeller, & Dougherty, 2002).  Overall then, self-control requires 
the inhibition of one response (the short-term or dominant) in pursuit of another response (the 
long-term or non-dominant).  Despite large amounts of research on self-control, the relation 
between these responses and motivation for action and inaction has not been investigated. 
Specifically, is inhibition facilitated more by goals for action or inaction? This is an important 
question, as recent empirical work has demonstrated that behavior can often be guided by broad 
goals to be generally active or inactive, regardless of the specific behavior that is ultimately 
pursued (Albarracin et al., 2008; Albarracin, Leeper, & Wang, 2009).  Lab studies have 
demonstrated that priming general goals for action (by presenting words related to action, such 
as “active” and “go”) leads to more active behavioral pursuit than priming general goals for 
inaction (by presenting words related to inaction, such as “rest” and “stop”). Throughout a 
number of studies, general action goals have lead to increases in both motor and cognitive 
behaviors, such as drawing, exercising, learning, and decision making.  Oppositely, general 
inaction goals have lead to corresponding decreases in all of these behaviors.  Importantly, these 
effects are not direct prime-to-behavior effects, but instead display goal properties, such as (a) 
increased effect strength with delayed goal pursuit, (b) goal satisfaction in response to executing 
goal-relevant behaviors, and (c) rebound effects of the inhibited goal when the focal goal is 
satisfied (Albarracin et al., 2008; Laran, 2009).  The implications of general goals for action and 
inaction on self-control behavior are not straightforward because these general goals influence 
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both cognitive and motor output.  As such, it is unclear whether general goals for action or 
inaction facilitate inhibition – there are legitimate arguments for both sides of this issue, and we 
will summarize them presently. 
2.2 The case for why action goals may facilitate self-control 
 Although many self-control situations require immediate behavioral inaction – 
particularly those situations that involve the avoidance of a tempting stimulus (e.g., not eating 
cake now to lose weight later) – the process of inhibition can often be quite cognitively effortful 
and consumes a great deal of physical resources (Gailliot et al., 2007).  Limited resource models 
of self-control often conceptualize the limited resource as being used up through “active 
volition” and later restored during periods void of such active volition – i.e., periods of inaction 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998).  Furthermore, preparation for action leads to 
the mobilization of important physiological resources that support instrumental behavior (Brehm, 
Wright, Solomon, Silka, & Greenberg, 1983; Wright, Brehm, & Bushman, 1989).  Recent 
evidence has demonstrated that subliminally priming general goals for action (vs. inaction and 
control goals) results in increased effort mobilization, operationalized via performance changes 
in the sympathetic nervous system (Gendolla & Silvestrini, in press).  Therefore, a goal for 
action may promote self-control through the mobilization of resources that are then available for 
inhibition.  Further, the same evidence that has linked general action goals to resource 
mobilization has also demonstrated that general inaction goals de-mobilize these resources to 
below-baseline levels (Gendolla & Silvestrini, in press).  If inhibition is a resource-heavy 
process, then decreased availability of resources in response to inaction goals should be expected 
to hinder rather than promote self-control (Gailliot et al., 2007). 
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2.3 The case for why inaction goals may facilitate self-control 
However, motivation for action could also be antagonistic with self-control through the 
direct promotion of action without adequate forethought.  Given that self-control suffers when 
the pressure to act is too high (Dickman, 1990), action goals may reduce self-control by 
increasing the pressure to execute a rushed action. Moreover, goals for inaction might be 
inherently compatible with self-controlled inhibition. After all, several common measures of 
inhibitory control are based on the ability to withhold an active response (i.e., to be inactive), 
which is a process that might be facilitated by general goals for inaction. 
2.4 Overview and rationale 
 As motivation for action and inaction are both plausible routes to achieve self-control 
success, in the present work we sought to determine whether general goals for action or inaction 
facilitate self-control behaviors in situations involving tempting stimuli.  In Experiment 1, we 
primed participants with a goal for action or inaction and then assessed their preference for 
immediate versus delayed monetary gratification using a delay discounting task (Ainslie,1975; 
Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999), which has been shown to predict self-control behavior in a variety 
of important domains, including illicit drug use (Kirby et al., 1999), alcohol abuse and 
dependence (Dom et al., 2006), binge eating (Yeomans et al., 2008), violent behavior (Cherek, 
Moeller, Dougherty, & Rhoades, 1997), and risky sexual activities (Lawyer, 2008).  In 
Experiment 2, we primed participants with a goal for action, inaction, or control and then 
assessed their ability to inhibit a dominant response to a tempting stimulus using a Go/No-Go 
task, which is a task associated with self-control behavior in various domains, including alcohol 
abuse (Dom et al., 2006), nicotine use (Mitchell, 2004), and violence (Dolan & Fullam, 2004).   
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 1 
3.1 Participants and overview 
 Twenty-nine male and female undergraduates participated in this experiment in return for 
partial course credit.  Participant sex had no effects and is not discussed further.  The design 
included two cells: action goal primes and inaction goal primes. 
3.2 Procedures and measures 
3.2.1 Cover story 
After entering the testing laboratory and being seated at a computer, participants were 
informed that they would complete a “verbal ability” task, which in reality served as a priming 
manipulation.  After priming, participants completed a “monetary decision task” that was 
actually used to assess self-control. 
3.2.2 Goal priming task 
Participants were randomly assigned to an action (n = 16) or inaction (n = 13) goal prime 
condition, and primes were presented in a word-completion task.  Participants were presented 
with 24 words that had certain letters missing and were asked to fill in the remaining letters to 
complete the words.  Of the 24 words, ten were “critical words” for each group, whereas the 
remaining 14 were fillers.  The critical words differed between action (e.g., “start, “active”) and 
inaction (e.g., “stop”, “pause”) conditions, and were selected based on their association with 
“action” or “rest” in the empirically derived Computerized Edinburgh Association Thesaurus 
(Kiss, Armstrong, Milroy, & Piper, 1973).  The target words have been extensively pretested and 
produce no mood effects, and prior use has confirmed that their presentation results in goal 
priming rather than simple conceptual priming (Albarracin et al., 2008; Laran, 2010).  During 
debriefing, no participants reported a belief that their responses to any of the earlier tasks 
6 
 
influenced their performance on later tasks, suggesting that participants were unaware of the 
nature of the goal priming task. 
3.2.3 Delay discounting task 
In delay discounting tasks, participants are presented with a series of choices between 
two hypothetical rewards – one is small and available relatively soon, whereas the other is large 
and available after some time delay.  The purpose of the task is to assess an individual’s 
preference for immediate versus delayed gratification.  In a typical delay discounting task, a 
question could be “Would you prefer $11 now or $30 in 7 days from now?”, and participants are 
considered self-controlled when they choose the larger, delayed option (in this case, $30).  In the 
present experiment, participants responded to a series of 27 such questions from Kirby et al. 
(1999), in which the monetary values (the tempting stimuli) ranged from $11 to $85 and the time 
delays ranged from 7 to 186 days.  Based on participants’ response patterns, researchers can 
generate a parameter representing impulsive decision making.  Two common parameters derived 
from delay discounting tasks are k-values (e.g., Kirby et al., 1999) and the area under the 
discounting curve (AUC; Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997).  In the present experiment, both 
estimates yielded identical results, and thus only k-values will be discussed. 
3.2.4 Self-control estimate 
To estimate the k-value for each participant, we used the following procedure: First, k-
values for each of the 27 questions were calculated, using the following formula (for a full 
discussion of this parameter, see Kirby et al., 1999): 
 
k = ((Large reward in dollars)/(Small reward in dollars) – 1)/(Time delay in days) 
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The higher the k-value, the more impulsive (less self-controlled) someone would have to be to 
choose the smaller, sooner option in that question.  Thus, when someone chooses the smaller 
reward on a question with a k-value of .25, this person is behaving much more impulsively than 
someone who chooses the smaller reward on a question with a k-value of .04.  When assessing k-
values, it is generally assumed that individuals’ behavior will conform to some specific k-value 
estimate, and thus participants should choose the larger reward for all questions with a larger k-
value than this estimate and the smaller reward for all questions with a smaller k-value than this 
estimate.  Therefore, after calculating the k-value for each question, we ordered the questions 
from smallest to largest k-value, and examined each participant’s data for a “switch point.” The 
switch point was defined as the question on which a participant stopped choosing the smaller 
reward and began choosing the larger reward once the questions were ordered based on k-value 
(note that the questions were randomly ordered when presented to participants).  Because 
participants’ responses were not perfectly consistent with this hypothetical pattern, we found the 
point that minimized discrepant responses – that is, we found the k-value for each participant that 
corresponded to a minimum number of large-reward choices for smaller k-values and small-
reward choices for larger k-values.  This k-value estimate was then assigned to the participant.  
This procedure is similar to the one used by Kirby et al. (1999), and as mentioned, identical 
results were obtained with a non-parametric AUC analysis (for details on AUC, see Green, 
Myerson, & McFadden, 1997). 
3.3 Results and discussion 
 A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on k-values using goal-prime as a between-
subjects factor revealed that participants in the action-goal condition (M k-value = 0.033; SD = 
0.022) were significantly more impulsive in their choices than participants in the inaction-goal 
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condition (M k-value = 0.010; SD = 0.011), F(1, 27) = 11.39, p = .002, partial η2 = .30.  These 
results, which are summarized in Figure 1, suggest that motivation for inaction facilitates self-
control relative to motivation for action.  Therefore, goals for action do not appear to promote 
self-controlled behavior, despite their ability to mobilize resources that are used for effortful 
behavior (Gendolla & Silvestrini, in press).  Unfortunately, this experiment’s lack of a control 
condition prevents us from knowing whether general inaction goals facilitate self-control, 
general action goals impair self-control, or both effects occur.  To resolve this ambiguity, 
Experiment 2 included a control condition. 
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3.4 Figures 
Figure 1. Effects of general goals for action and inaction on delay of gratification 
 
Note. Higher values represent less delay of gratification. Therefore, lower values indicate more 
self-control. 
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 2 
4.1 Participants and overview 
 Fifty-one male and female undergraduates participated in this experiment in return for 
partial course credit.  Participant sex had no effects and is not discussed further.  The design 
included three cells: action prime, control prime, and inaction prime. 
4.2 Procedures and measures 
4.2.1 Cover story 
Upon entering the testing laboratory and being seated at a computer, participants were 
informed that they would complete two Go/No-Go (GNG) training blocks, an ostensible “visual 
perception” task that served as a subliminal priming manipulation, and a final GNG block.  The 
last GNG block provided our dependent measures. 
4.2.2 Go/No-Go task 
In GNG tasks, participants are presented with a series of stimuli on a computer and are 
instructed to respond to certain stimuli (“go”), but to withhold responding to all other stimuli 
(“no-go”).  The dependent measures that are available from this task are false alarms (FA), 
misses (MI), and mean reaction time to respond to “go” stimuli (RT).  FAs (trials on which a 
participant should have withheld a response but did not) measure a lack self-control, as they 
represent an inability to inhibit the dominant “go” response.  MI (trials on which a participant 
should have responded but did not) are related to inattention (Derefinko et al., 2008).  Based on 
the results of Experiment 1, we hypothesized that action goals would lead to more FA than 
inaction goals.  Because MI are not directly related to inhibitory behavioral control, we did not 
predict differences on this measure.  Although RT is not a direct measure of self-control, 
previous work has demonstrated that the resources mobilized by action goals can lead to faster 
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response times on certain tasks (Gendolla & Silvestrini, in press).  Therefore, it is possible that 
action goals may lead to quicker RT than inaction goals, and this RT difference may thus be 
related to FA.  However, the previous work demonstrating effects of action-inaction goals on RT 
used a memory recall task rather than a motor inhibition paradigm, and thus this prediction is 
somewhat speculative and secondary to the current aims of uncovering the effects of action-
inaction goals on self-control. 
Because of our hypothesis that action-inaction motivation should moderate self-control 
behavior, we wanted to use targets in the GNG tasks that held some important motivational 
relevance for our participants.  Therefore, each block of GNG consisted of 60 trials, and on each 
trial the word “condom” or “sex” was presented.  In the first block of practice GNG, half of the 
participants were randomly assigned to respond to “condom” but not “sex”, and the other half to 
“sex” but not “condom”.  Within each block, 45 trials were “go” trials that required participants 
to respond by clicking the computer mouse, whereas the remaining 15 trials were “no-go” trials 
that required participants to withhold responding.  This ratio was used to establish “go” as the 
dominant response.  Words were presented for 200 ms, and there was a 2-second interval 
between word presentations.  For the second GNG training block, response patterns were 
switched, so that participants who initially responded to “condom” responded to “sex”, and vice-
versa.  The switch was intended to ensure that each group had been exposed to “condom” and 
“sex” an equal number of times before the critical GNG block.  Participants were given two full 
practice GNG blocks before the goal manipulation. 
4.2.3 Goal priming task 
 Participants were randomly assigned to an action goal (n = 19), inaction goal (n = 22), or 
control prime condition (n = 20).  As part of an ostensible visual perception task, participants 
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were instructed to carefully watch the computer screen and respond by pressing the space bar 
immediately each time they saw a string of asterisks appear (******).  Each trial was separated 
by a 2 second interval and consisted of a fixation cross presentation, followed by a 60 ms 
forward mask of ampersands (&&&&&&), a 25 ms goal prime, a 60 ms backward mask of 
ampersands, and then a 200 ms presentation of asterisks.  The goal primes differed between 
conditions and were words that denoted action (e.g., “start”, “active”), inaction (e.g., “pause”, 
“still”), or neutral concepts (e.g., “square”, “candle”).  During debriefing, no participants 
reported awareness of the subliminal primes or indicated a belief that their responses to any of 
the earlier tasks influenced their performance on later tasks, suggesting that participants were 
unaware of the nature of the goal priming task. 
4.2.4 Critical Go/No-Go block 
After the goal prime task, participants completed a final GNG block.  The response 
pattern was the same one used in the second GNG training block, such that participants who 
were asked to respond to “condom” in the second training block were again asked to respond to 
“condom” but not “sex”, and vice-versa.  As before, there were 45 “go” trials and 15 “no-go” 
trials.  We computed three dependent variables, including FA, MI, and RT. 
4.3 Results and discussion 
4.3.1 Data cleaning 
 Participants whose responses to the second practice GNG and critical GNG blocks 
indicated that they failed to read and understand the instructions to switch response patterns from 
the initial GNG practice block (e.g., change from “go to sex” to “go to condom”) and thus had 
exceptionally high error rates for both FA and MI were excluded from all analyses (i.e., these 
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participants had error rates that approached 100%).  This excluded a total of 10 participants (3 
action, 3 inaction, and 4 control), leaving 16 action, 19 inaction, and 16 control participants. 
4.3.2. Initial analysis of false alarms, misses, and reaction times 
A 3 (goal prime: action, control, inaction) x 2 (go stimulus: “condom”, “sex”) ANOVA 
on FA revealed a main effect of prime, F(2, 45) = 3.78, p < .05, partial η2 = .14, a main effect of 
go stimulus, F(1, 45) = 4.03, p = .05, partial η2 = .08, but no significant interaction of prime and 
go stimulus, F < 1.  Identical ANOVAs on MI and RT revealed no significant effects, all Fs < 
1.9, ps > .17. 
4.3.3 Follow-up analysis of false alarms 
 A post-hoc Tukey test for goal-prime condition on FA revealed that participants with an 
inaction goal committed significantly fewer FA (M = 1.26; SD = 1.37) than participants with an 
action goal (M = 3.13; SD = 2.42).  Although neither inaction nor action differed significantly 
from control (M = 2.44; SD = 1.79), the pattern of means indicates that inaction goals led to more 
self-controlled behavior, whereas action goals led to more impulsive behavior. 
 The main effect of go stimulus on FA indicates that participants were more impulsive 
when they had to respond to “sex” (M FA = 2.84; SD = 2.27) than “condom” (M = 1.62; SD = 
1.53).  As previously indicated, this effect did not interact with goal condition, suggesting that 
action-inaction goals exert strong, independent effects on self-control above and beyond the 
nature of the stimulus at hand.  Overall, this result suggested that action-inaction motivation may 
be fundamentally important in self-control situations. 
4.3.4 Conclusions 
 These results, which are summarized in Figure 2, support and extend the findings of 
Experiment 1, and suggest that self-control is facilitated by goals for inaction and hindered by 
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goals for action.  Although the difference in RT did not reach significance, the pattern of means 
was in a meaningful direction, such that action goals led to quicker responding (M = 333 ms; SD 
= 39 ms) and inaction goals to slower responding (M = 365 ms; SD = 49 ms) compared to control 
(M = 340 ms; SD = 62 ms).  To further explore the relation between RT and FA, we calculated 
the pearson-correlation between these variables: r = -.41, p = .003.  This correlation indicates 
that participants who were quicker to respond in the GNG task also tended to make more FA.  
Considering this fact together with the pattern of RT means in the prime conditions suggests that 
goals for action may lead to quick, impulsive responding, whereas goals for inaction may lead to 
slower, more reasoned behavior. 
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4.4 Figures 
Figure 2. Effects of general goals for action and inaction on the ability to inhibit a 
dominant response 
 
Note. Higher values represent less inhibition of the dominant response. Therefore, lower values 
indicate more self-control. 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
5.1 Summary 
Although successful self-control often requires behavioral inaction (e.g., not eating a 
piece of cake), self-control itself is commonly referred to as a form of “active volition” (see 
Baumeister et al., 1998).  Therefore, the influence of general goals to be active or inactive on 
self-control behavior was not theoretically straightforward.  Goals for action could promote self-
control through resource mobilization available for active self-control, whereas goals for inaction 
could hinder self-control by down-regulating these resources.  However, goals for action could 
also be antagonistic with self-control by promoting active behavior in response to tempting 
stimuli, whereas goals for inaction could support self-control by promoting relative inaction, thus 
reducing the active or immediate responses that define impulsivity in these situations.  Therefore, 
it was unclear a priori whether goals for action or inaction would provide the more successful 
route to self-control in the present experiments. 
The two experiments reported in this paper suggest that motivation for inaction facilitates 
self-control, whereas motivation for action hinders self-control.  Because self-control consists of 
the preference for larger, delayed gratification compared to immediate gratification (Ainslie, 
1975), as well as the ability to inhibit dominant but inappropriate responses (Logan & Cowan, 
1984; Swann et al., 2002), we used separate tasks to measure both facets.  In Experiment 1, 
participants with a general goal for inaction (vs. action) displayed significantly stronger 
preferences for delayed gratification.  In Experiment 2, participants with a general goal for 
inaction were significantly more capable of inhibiting a dominant motor response, whereas 
participants with a goal for action were less capable of inhibiting this response.  Furthermore, 
this pattern occurred whether the stimulus to be avoided was highly attractive (“sex”) or not 
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(“condom”).  Overall then, these experiments suggest that goals for inaction can facilitate self-
control, whereas goals for action can hinder self-control. 
5.2 Limitations 
Although the reaction time measures in Experiment 2 were in a theoretically meaningful 
pattern (action < control < inaction) that conceptually replicated previous work (Gendolla & 
Silvestrini, in press), the differences did not reach significance.  Nonetheless, this pattern 
suggests that motivation for action mobilizes resources that encourage rapid behavioral 
execution, whereas motivation for inaction de-mobilizes these behavior-execution resources.  
This is one potential mechanism for the present findings – that is, motivation for inaction 
facilitates self-control by down-regulating resources that are used to execute behaviors in a rapid 
manner.  This extra time between stimulus onset and behavioral execution may allow “cool” 
cognitions to override initial “hot” responses to tempting stimuli (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).  
However, in the present studies physiological measures were not used and the reaction time 
measure did not quite reach significance.  Therefore, the claim that inaction leads to increased 
self-control by de-mobilizing resources that encourage immediate, impulsive responding requires 
further support, though the present studies provide some initial evidence for this claim. 
5.3 Strengths 
 A strength of the present study was operationalizing self-control with two distinct 
measures – Experiment 1 measured preference for delayed gratification, whereas Experiment 2 
measured the ability to inhibit a dominant motor response.  Additionally, the first experiment 
used a supraliminal word completion task to prime action-inaction goals, whereas the second 
experiment used a subliminal priming procedure.  The difference in effect size for prime 
condition between the two experiments (partial η2 = .30 in Experiment 1 vs. partial η2 = .14 in 
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Experiment 2) may be due to this difference in goal priming procedure and/or operationalization 
of self-control.  In light of these differences between experiments, the consistent effects of 
action-inaction motivation on self-control are particularly persuasive and suggest that motivation 
for inaction facilitates self-control, whereas motivation for action hinders self-control.  The 
magnitude of this effect may vary depending on the strength of the motivation and the nature of 
the self-control behavior, but the existence of the effect is clear. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
 Taken together, the present experiments suggest that self-control is facilitated by 
motivation for inaction and hindered by motivation for action.  This effect is robust and is found 
when examining different forms of self-control behavior and when instilling this motivation both 
supra- and subliminally.  One possible mechanism for this effect is the modulation of resources 
that encourage behavioral execution, but further work is needed on this point.  For now, the 
implications are clear: when presented with a self-control dilemma, a goal to be inactive is likely 
to lead to more self-control success than a goal to be active.  Instead of listening to common 
wisdom and “fighting” your urges by “exerting” your willpower to counter a temptation, you 
may fare much better in your quest to not eat that piece of chocolate cake by simply relaxing and 
adopting a goal to be inactive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
REFERENCES 
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: a behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse control. 
Psychological Bulletin 82, 463–496. 
Albarracin, D., Handley, I. M., Noguchi, K., McCulloch, K. C., Li, H., Leeper, J., Brown, R. D., 
Earl, A., & Hart, W. P. (2008). Increasing and decreasing motor and cognitive output: A 
model of general action and inaction goals. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 95, 510-523. 
Albarracin, D., Wang, W., & Leeper, J. (2009). Immediate increase in food intake following 
exercise messages. Obesity, 17, 1451-1452. 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is the 
active self a limited-resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1252-
1265. 
Brehm, J. W., Wright, R. A., Solomon, S., Silka, L., & Greenberg, J. (1983). Perceived 
difficulty, energization, and the magnitude of goal valence. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 19, 21-48. 
Cherek, D. R., Moeller, F. G., Dougherty, D. M., & Rhoades, H. (1997). Studies of violent and 
nonviolent male parolees: II. Laboratory and psychometric measurements of impulsivity. 
Biological Psychiatry, 41, 523-529. 
Derefinko, K. J., Adams, Z. W., Milich, R., Fillmore, M. T., Lorch, E. P., & Lynam, D. R. 
(2008). Response style differences in the inattentive and combined subtypes of attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 36, 745-758. 
Dickman, S. J. (1990). Functional and dysfunctional Impulsivity: Personality and cognitive 
correlates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 95-102. 
20 
 
Dolan, M. & Fullam, R. (2004). Behavioural and psychometric measures of impulsivity in a 
personality disordered population. The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 15, 
426-450. 
Dom, G., de Wilde, B., Hulstijn, W., van den Brink, W., Sabbe, B. (2006). Behavioural aspects 
of impulsivity in alcoholics with and without a cluster-B personality disorder. Alcohol & 
Alcoholism, 41, 412-420. 
Gailliot, M. T., Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Maner, J. K., Plant, E. A., Tice, D. M., 
Brewer, L. E., & Schmeichel, B. J. (2007). Self-control relies on glucose as a limited 
energy resource: Willpower is more than a metaphor. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 92, 325-336. 
Gendolla, G. H. E. & Silvestrini, N. (2010). The implicit “go”: Masked action cues directly 
mobilize mental effort. Psychological Science, in press. 
Green, L., Myerson, J., & McFadden, E. (1997). Rate of temporal discounting decreases with 
amount of reward. Memory & Cognition, 25, 715–723. 
Kirby, K. N., Petry, N. M., & Bickel, W. K. (1999). Heroin addicts have higher discount rates for 
delayed rewards than non-drug-using controls. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 128, 78-87. 
Kiss, G. R., Armstrong, C., Milroy, R., & Piper, J. (1973). An associative thesaurus of English 
and its computer analysis. In A. J. Aitkin, R. W. Bailey, & N. Hamilton-Smith (Eds.), 
The computer and literary studies. Edinburgh, UK: University Press. 
Laran, J. (2010). The influence of information processing goal pursuit on postdecision affect and  
behavioral intentions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98, 16-28. 
21 
 
Lawyer, S. R. (2008). Probability and delay discounting of erotic stimuli. Behavioral Processes, 
79, 36-42. 
Logan, G. D. & Cowan, W. B. (1984). On the ability to inhibit thought and action: A theory of 
an act of control. Psychological Review, 91, 295-327. 
Metcalfe, J. & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: 
Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review, 106, 3-19. 
Mitchell, S. H. (2004). Measuring impulsivity and modeling its association with cigarette 
smoking. Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews, 3, 261-275. 
Swann, A. C., Bjork, J. M., Moeller, G., & Dougherty, D. M. (2002). Two models of 
impulsivity: Relationship to personality traits and psychopathology. Biological 
Psychiatry, 51, 988-994. 
Wright, R. A., Brehm, J. W., & Bushman, B. J. (1989). Cardiovascular responses to threat: 
Effects of the difficulty and availability of a cognitive avoidant task. Basic and Applied 
Social Psychology, 10, 161-171. 
Wright, R. A. & Kirby, L. D. (2001). Effort determination of cardiovascular response: An 
integrative analysis with applications in social psychology. Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, 33, 255-307. 
Yeomans, M. R., Leitch, M., & Mobini, S. (2008). Impulsivity is associated with the 
disinhibition but not restraint factor from the Three Factor Eating Questionnaire. 
Appetite, 50, 469-476. 
 
